










































Bible, guns, and land
Citation for published version:
Longkumer, A 2018, 'Bible, guns, and land: Sovereignty and nationalism amongst the Nagas of India',
Nations and Nationalism, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 1097-1116. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12405
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/nana.12405
Link:






This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Longkumer, A. (2018) Bible, guns and land: sovereignty
and nationalism amongst the Nagas of India. Nations and Nationalism, doi: 10.1111/nana.12405., which has
been published in final form at http://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12405. This article may be used for non-commercial
purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
 
1 
Bible,	  Guns,	  and	  Land:	  Sovereignty	  and	  nationalism	  amongst	  the	  Nagas	  of	  India.	  
	  
Abstract	  This	   paper	   will	   argue	   that	   to	   understand	   Naga	   sovereignty,	   one	   must	   take	   into	   account	   the	  intimate	  connection	  between	  Christianity	  and	  nationalism.	  This	   relationship	   is	   centred	  on	   the	  idea	  of	   ‘Nagaland	  for	  Christ’,	  a	  central	  slogan	  (also	  seen	  as	  a	  covenant)	  for	  all	  Naga	  nationalist	  groups.	  It	  suggests	  that	  God	  is	  the	  primary	  agent	  in	  sovereignty,	  and	  that	  the	  land	  is	  connected	  with	   the	   idea	  of	  Nagaland	   for	  Christ.	   I	  argue	   that	  national	   territory	   is	  not	  an	  object	  or	  a	  place	  that	  can	  be	  fixed	  in	  time,	  but	  rather	  an	  act	  of	  narration	  and	  imagination	  with	  the	  power	  to	  shape	  where	  it	  belongs.	  I	  will	  make	  the	  case	  that	  we	  need	  to	  rethink	  modular	  forms	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  are	  based	  on	  a	  strong	  national	  state.	  Instead	  it	  would	  be	  more	  useful	  to	  think	  about	  sovereign	  territories	   as	   the	   organisation	   of	   space,	   or	   territoriality	   (Sack	   1986).	   Robert	   Sack	   argues	   that	  territoriality	  is	  ‘intimately	  related	  to	  how	  people	  use	  the	  land’,	  how	  they	  ‘organize	  themselves	  in	  space	   and	   how	   they	   give	   meaning	   to	   place’	   (Sack	   1986:	   2).	   If	   history	   has	   shown	   us	   that	  ascertaining	   the	   precise	   territorial	   lines	   of	   national	   units	   are	   always	   a	   challenge,	   it	   is	   more	  helpful	  to	  try	  and	  understand	  how	  people	  give	  meaning	  to	  place	  regardless	  of	  boundaries.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Introduction	  Draped	  in	  a	  traditional	  Naga	  shawl,	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	   India	  Narendra	  Modi,	  along	  with	  23	  other	  dignitaries,	  smiles	  for	  the	  camera	  on	  the	  3rd	  August	  2015.	   	  The	  occasion	  is	  the	  signing	  of	  the	   historic	   peace	   accord,	   popularly	   known	   as	   the	   ‘framework	   agreement’,	   between	   the	  Government	  of	  India	  (GOI)	  and	  the	  Nationalist	  Socialist	  Council	  of	  Nagalim,	  Isak-­‐Muivah	  (NSCN-­‐IM).	   	  After	  18	  years	  of	  peace	  negotiations	  beginning	   in	  1997	  and	  armed	  conflict	   that	  began	   in	  the	   1950s,	   the	   Naga	   war	   with	   the	   Indian	   state	   is	   one	   of	   the	   longest	   in	   the	   world,	   stretching	  across	   almost	   60	   years.	   	   The	   framework	   agreement	  was	   an	   attempt	   to	   re-­‐energise	   the	   1997	  ailing	  peace	  process	  and	  to	  find	  a	  final	  solution	  to	  the	  protracted	  conflict.	  	  	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  discussion	  was	  that	  of	  Naga	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  birth-­‐right,	  something	  the	  Nagas	  have	   upheld	   since	   their	   movement	   for	   independence	   began	   in	   the	   1940s.	   	   According	   to	   the	  media,	  under	  discussion	  was	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  pan-­‐Naga	  ‘autonomy’	  for	  the	  different	  Naga	  tribes	  of	  India.1	  A	  year	  after	  the	  ‘framework	  agreement’,	  the	  Minister	  of	  State	  for	  Home,	  Kiren	  Rijiju,	  told	  the	  Hindu	  newspaper	  that	  sovereignty	  was	  no	  longer	  on	  the	  table	  and	  instead,	  the	  Nagas	  want	  a	  settlement	  within	   the	   Indian	   constitution.2	   Thuingaleng	  Muivah	   the	   general	   secretary	   for	   the	  NSCN-­‐IM	   however	   emphasised	   that	   they	   had	   not	   given	   up	   their	   demands	   for	   sovereignty,	  despite	   Rijiju’s	   remarks.3	   	   While	   these	   conflicting	   statements	   over	   sovereignty	   do	   not	   help	  matters,	   equally	   perplexing	   are	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   framework	   agreement	   which	   remain	  undisclosed.	  	  Confounding	  and	  indeed	  unclear,	  has	  the	  2015	  peace	  accord	  settled	  matters	  or	  is	  it	  
                                                      1	   http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-­‐others/govt-­‐signs-­‐peace-­‐accord-­‐with-­‐nscnim-­‐pm-­‐narendra-­‐modi-­‐says-­‐historic/	  2	  http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nscn-­‐has-­‐not-­‐given-­‐up-­‐on-­‐sovereignty-­‐says-­‐muivah/article8820302.ece	  3	  Ibid.	  	  	  
 
2 
just	   political	   staging?	   	   This	   grand	   political	   gesture	   cannot	   satiate	   the	   unique	   demands	   of	   the	  Naga	  people	  and	  indeed	  it	  cannot	  capture	  the	  history	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  frame-­‐by-­‐frame	  camera	  smiles	  and	  handshakes.	  	  It	  requires	  a	  more	  thorough	  examination	  in	  order	  to	  place	  the	  specific	  mechanisms	  of	  nation	  building	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  grand	  gesturing	  that	  Modi	  with	  a	  Naga	  shawl	  displays.	  	  So	  how	  did	  the	  Nagas	  and	  the	  GOI	  arrive	  at	  this	  juncture?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  larger	  geopolitical	  situation,	  this	  paper	  will	  argue	  that	  to	  understand	  Naga	  sovereignty,	  one	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  intimate	  connection	  between	  Christianity	  and	  nationalism.	  This	   relationship	   is	   centred	  on	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘Nagaland	   for	   Christ’,	   a	   central	   slogan	  (also	   seen	   as	   a	   covenant)	   for	   all	   Naga	   nationalist	   groups.	   It	   suggests	   that	   God	   is	   the	   primary	  agent	  in	  sovereignty,	  and	  that	  the	  land	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  Nagaland	  for	  Christ.	  I	  argue	  that	  national	  territory	  is	  not	  an	  object	  or	  a	  place	  that	  can	  be	  fixed	  in	  time,	  but	  rather	  an	  act	  of	  narration	  and	  imagination	  with	  the	  power	  to	  shape	  where	  it	  belongs.	  I	  will	  make	  the	  case	  that	  we	   need	   to	   rethink	   modular	   forms	   of	   sovereignty	   that	   are	   based	   on	   a	   strong	   national	   state	  (Shaw	  2008;	  Robbins	  2006;	  Muehlebach	  2001;	  Chatterjee	  1993;	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattarri	  1987).	  Instead	  it	  would	  be	  more	  useful	  to	  think	  about	  sovereign	  territories	  as	  the	  organisation	  of	  space,	  or	  territoriality	  (Sack	  1986).	  Robert	  Sack	  argues	  that	  territoriality	  is	  ‘intimately	  related	  to	  how	  people	   use	   the	   land’,	   how	   they	   ‘organize	   themselves	   in	   space	   and	   how	   they	   give	  meaning	   to	  place’	   (Sack	  1986:	  2).	   If	   history	  has	   shown	  us	   that	   ascertaining	   the	  precise	   territorial	   lines	  of	  national	  units	  are	  always	  a	  challenge,	  it	  is	  more	  helpful	  to	  try	  and	  understand	  how	  people	  give	  meaning	  to	  place	  regardless	  of	  boundaries.	  	  	  	  	  	  What	   this	   means	   in	   the	   nationalist	   narrative	   is	   twofold:	   that	   Nagaland	   becoming	   a	   land	   of	  missions	  –	  sending	  Christian	  missionaries	  all	  over	  the	  world	  –	  and	  territorial	  independence	  are	  two	   sides	   of	   the	   same	   coin	   (Longkumer	   forthcoming).	   Furthermore,	   the	   idea	   of	   Nagaland	   for	  Christ	  is	  contrasted	  largely	  with	  what	  the	  nationalists	  perceive	  as	  ‘Hindu-­‐India’.	  This	  perception	  is	  pivotal	  in	  resisting	  the	  larger	  resonating	  force	  of	  the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Naga	   independence	  movement	   in	   the	  1940s,	  which	  accelerated	  under	   the	  military	  excess	  and	  armament	   in	   the	   region	   from	   the	   1950s	   onwards.	   Like	   most	   nationalist	   movements,	  constructing	  an	  ‘other’	  through	  which	  one’s	  identity	  is	  strengthened	  and	  crystallised	  is	  a	  useful	  tactic.	   Here,	   the	   Indian	   state	   and	   its	   military	   machine	   is	   portrayed	   as	   the	   ‘Hindu-­‐other’	  oppressing	   the	   Nagas.	   This	   hegemony	   is	   associated	  with	   the	   forceful	  military	   tactics	   and	   the	  draconian	  Arms	  Forces	  Special	  Powers	  Act	  (AFSPA)	  which	  gives	  unprecedented	  military	  power.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Nagas	  (and	  the	  larger	  Northeast	  of	  India)	  it	  has	  meant	  that	  the	  Indian	  military	  has	  used	  AFSPA	  with	   impunity	   (Kikon	  2009;	  McDuie-­‐Ra	  2009).	  The	   context	  of	  understanding	  Naga	   nationalism	   must	   therefore	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	   conditions	   created	   by	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militarisation.	  I	  begin	  by	  elaborating	  on	  Naga	  identity,	  whether	  it	  is	  primordial	  or	  modern,	  and	  how	  this	  discussion	  continues	  to	  polarise	  opinions.	  Second,	   I	  will	  examine	  the	  history	  of	  Naga	  nationalism	  by	  noting	  important	  events	  and	  providing	  a	  context	  to	  understand	  the	  link	  between	  Naga	  nationalism	  and	  Christianity.	  Finally,	   I	  will	  examine	  the	   idea	  of	   ‘Nagaland	   for	  Christ’	  and	  how	  the	  Nagas’	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  premised	  very	  much	  on	  this	  idea.	  	  	  
	  




Articulating	  national	  identity	  Various	   Naga	   authors	   (Yonuo	   1974;	   Alemchiba	   1970;	   Horam	   1988)	   have	   remarked	   that	   the	  shared	  experience	  in	  the	  Labour	  Corps	  during	  World	  War	  I	  was	  responsible	  for	  a	  collective	  and	  broader	  sense	  of	  Naga	  belonging.	  Around	  4,	  000	  Nagas	  were	  sent	  to	  France	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Labour	  Corps,	  and	  saw	  ‘civilised	  nations’	  fight	  for	  their	  own	  honour	  while	  condemning	  Naga	  conflicts	  as	  barbarous,	   petty	   squabbles.	   This	   experience	   provided	   a	   reason	   for	   political	   unification	   to	  represent	  their	  claim	  to	  the	  world	  (Yonuo	  1974).	  Upon	  returning	  home,	  they	  formed	  the	  Naga	  Club	  in	  1919	  informally	  supported	  by	  the	  local	  British	  administrators	  and	  organised	  primarily	  by	  Naga	  Christian	  educated	  government	  officials	  and	  several	  headmen	  around	  the	  two	  principal	  villages	  –	  Mokokchung	  and	  Kohima.	  When	  the	  Simon	  Commission	  headed	  by	  Sir	  John	  Simon,	  a	  British	  politician,	  came	  to	  Kohima	  in	  1929,	  to	  seek	  opinions	  on	  the	  future	  of	  India,	  twenty	  Naga	  tribes	  signed	  and	  submitted	  a	  memorandum	  that	  stated:	  	  …We	  pray	  that	  the	  British	  Government	  will	  continue	  to	  safeguard	  our	  rights	  against	  all	   encroachments…that	   we	   should	   not	   be	   thrust	   to	   the	   mercy	   of	   the	   people	   [i.e.	  India]	  who	  could	  never	  have	  conquered	  us	   themselves,	  and	   to	  whom	  we	  are	  never	  subjected;	   but	   to	   leave	   us	   alone	   to	   determine	   for	   ourselves	   as	   in	   ancient	   times	  (Alemchiba	  1970:	  164).	  	  	  	  Around	  17	  years	  later,	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  this	  debate	  regarding	  Naga	  independence	  was	  Jawaharlal	  Nehru,	  the	  first	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  India,	  and	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  (INC).	  	  Sensing	  that	  something	  had	  to	  be	  done	  about	  the	   ‘tribal’	  Naga	  areas	  of	  Northeast	  India,	  Nehru	  wrote	   to	   T.	   Sakhrie	   (the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Naga	   National	   Council	   [NNC]	   formed	   in	  February	   1946)	   on	   1st	   August	   1946.	   	   In	   his	   letter,	   Nehru	   explained	   his	   view	   that	   the	   Naga	  territory	  was	  too	  small	  to	  be	  politically	  and	  economically	  independent.	  Nehru	  strongly	  insisted	  on	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   Nagas	   within	   the	   Indian	   union	   and	   Indian	   laws.	   This	   certainty	   of	  Nehru’s	   position	   regarding	   the	   Naga	   Hills,	   departed	   from	   Gandhi	   who	   supported	   an	  independent	   ‘Naga	   area’:	   ‘…If	   you	   do	   not	   wish	   to	   join	   the	   Indian	   Union…The	   Congress	  Government	  will	  not	  do	  that’	   (quoted	   in	  Venuh	  2005:	  67).	  Things	  were	  uneven	  on	  the	  ground	  between	   the	   loosely	   articulated	   INC	   stand	   of	   no	   forced	   integration	   (maintained	   by	   its	   leader	  Gandhi)	  to	  those	  that	  were	  coming	  from	  other	  avenues.	  For	  example,	  the	  British	  administrator	  Mildred	  Archer	  in	  1947	  canvassed	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  then	  Assam	  Governor,	  Akbar	  Hydari,	  who	  was	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   Naga	   Hills,	   which	   would	   later	   go	   on	   to	   form	   Nagaland,	   regarding	  independence	  for	  the	  Nagas	   in	  1947:	   ‘They	  have	  got	  to	  come	  in.	   	   If	   they	  revolt;	  we	  shall	  shoot	  them	  up.	  	  It	  will	  be	  a	  pity	  but	  it	  will	  not	  be	  our	  fault;	  We	  couldn’t	  give	  Nagas	  residual	  Powers…A	  Naga	  Government	  is	  out	  of	  the	  question…’(quoted	  in	  Franke	  2006:	  73).	  	  	  	  Although	  things	  were	  at	  a	  stalemate,	  the	  NNC	  entered	  into	  dialogue	  with	  Governor,	  Hydari,	  and	  the	  ‘9-­‐Point	  Agreement’	  was	  drawn	  up	  in	  June	  1947	  that	  recognised	  the	  right	  of	  the	  NNC	  to	  run	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the	  affairs	  of	  the	  Nagas.	   	  The	  main	  bone	  of	  contention	  was	  point	  9	  –	  that	   is	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  political	  future	  of	  the	  Nagas.	  	  It	  stated	  that	  the	  Governor	  of	  Assam	  would	  act	  as	  a	  special	  agent	  between	   the	   GOI	   and	   the	  Nagas	   for	   a	   period	   of	   ten	   years,	   after	  which	   the	  NNC	  would	   take	   a	  decision	  regarding	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Nagas.	  The	  NNC	  thought	  that	  this	  clause	  would	  enable	  them	  to	   opt	   out	   of	   the	   Indian	   union	   in	   10	   years.	   This	   was	   subsequently	   denied	   by	   the	   GOI.	   	   As	   a	  symbolic	  protest	  to	  Indian	  hegemony,	  the	  Nagas	  declared	  independence	  on	  14th	  August	  1947	  –	  the	  day	  before	  Indian	  independence	  –	  signed	  by	  9	  members	  of	  the	  NNC.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  year	  1949	  marked	  a	  crucial	  period	  for	  the	  GOI	  and	  the	  NNC.	  	  In	  1949	  the	  chief	  minister	  of	  Assam,	  Gopinath	  Bordoloi,	  informed	  the	  NNC	  that	  the	  GOI	  had	  never	  accepted	  the	  9-­‐point	  agreement.	  	  This	  was	  seen	  by	  the	  NNC	  as	  a	  betrayal	  and	  it	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  the	  more	  moderate	   NNC	   members	   lost	   ground	   and	   a	   clear	   majority	   now	   wanted	   total	   and	   complete	  independence.	   	  A	  plebiscite	   in	  1950,	  conducted	  by	  the	  NNC,	  was	  meant	  to	  echo	  this	  sentiment	  whereby	   it	   was	   recorded	   that	   99.9	   percent	   of	   the	   Nagas	   in	   the	   Naga	   Hills	   supported	  independence.	   	   This	   move	   was	   summarily	   ignored	   by	   the	   GOI.	   	   The	   President	   of	   the	   NNC,	  Zapuphizo,	  met	  Nehru	  again	   in	  1952	  by	  which	  time	  the	  situation	  had	  worsened,	  and	  relations	  broke	  down	   further	  with	   the	  GOI	  now	  blaming	   the	  British	  and	  American	  Baptist	  missionaries	  who	  missionised	  the	  Nagas,	  for	  encouraging	  Naga	  independence	  (Franke	  2006:	  74;	  Jacobs	  1998:	  159;	  Longkumer	  forthcoming	  ‘Along	  Kingdom’s	  Highway’).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  years	  1950-­‐56	  saw	  armed	  escalation	  on	  both	  sides,	  with	  military	  skirmishes	  first	  reported	  on	   25th	   March	   1955	   (Iralu	   2000:	   87).	   This	   was	   marked	   by	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Federal	  Government	  of	  Nagaland	   (FGN)	   in	  1956,	   the	  political	  wing	  of	   the	  NNC,	  which	   acted	   as	   the	  de	  facto	  Government	   for	   the	  Nagas.	  However,	   differences	   to	   independence	   arose,	   resulted	   in	   the	  formation	  of	  the	  Naga	  People’s	  Convention	  (NPC),	  which	  supported	  Naga	  statehood	  within	  the	  Indian	   union.	   In	   1963	   the	   new	   state	   of	  Nagaland	  was	   inaugurated.	   The	   creation	   of	   statehood	  further	   legitimised	   the	   position	   of	   the	  GOI	  who	   refused	   to	   retreat	   from	   their	   idea	   of	   national	  integration,	  only	  causing	  further	  divisions	  with	  the	  NNC.	  	  	  By	  1956	   a	  hundred	   thousand	   Indian	   soldiers	  were	  deployed	   in	   the	  Naga	  Hills	   to	   suppress	   an	  elusive	  and	  tiny	  guerrilla	  force	  of	  a	  few	  thousands	  with	  casualties	  reported	  on	  both	  sides.	  The	  introduction	   of	   the	   1958	   Armed	   Forces	   Special	   Powers	   Act	   (AFSPA)	   into	   Nagaland,	   already	  classified	  as	  a	   ‘disturbed	  area’	   in	  1956,	   introduced	  unprecedented	  powers	   to	  stop,	   search	  and	  shoot	  to	  kill	  as	  necessary.	  This	  only	  fuelled	  mistrust	  and	  disdain	  of	  the	  Indian	  military.	  Kanwar	  Randip	   Singh,	   a	   former	   Indian	   officer,	   who	   served	   in	   the	   Naga	   Hills	   from	   1953-­‐57,	   says	   that	  none	   of	   the	   Indian	   officers	  mixed	  with	   the	  Nagas	   nor	   learned	   their	  way	   of	   life.	   	   ‘In	   fact,	   they	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considered	   these	   people	   as	   subhuman,	   filthy	   and	   not	   worth	   mixing	   [with]…a	   big	   gap	   was	  created	  between	  the	  Nagas	  and	  the	  government	  after	  the	  British	  left’	  (quoted	  in	  Glancey	  2011:	  180).	   	  Another	   view	   from	   John	  Bosco	   Jasokie,	   a	   former	  Chief	  Minister	  of	  Nagaland,	   interprets	  what	  these	  attitudes	  have	  meant	  for	  the	  Nagas.	  	  	  They	   [the	   plains	   people	   of	   Hindustan]	   believe	   that	   their	   way	   of	   life	   is	   the	   right	  way…[and]	  are	  not	  prepared	  to	  accept	  us	  as	  human	  beings	  and,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  easier	  for	  them	  to	  go	  out	  of	  all	  human	  decency	  in	  their	  dealings	  with	  us…they	  think	  that	  by	  harassing	  the	  people	  they	  have	  done	  a	  great	  service	  to	  India,	  but	  actually	  India	  lost	  the	  friendship	  of	  the	  people	  (quoted	  in	  Glancey	  2011:	  181).	  	  	  	  Following	  on	  from	  political	  dialogues,	  and	  military	  operations	  in	  the	  region,	   the	  Council	  of	  the	  Baptist	   Churches	   of	   Nagaland	   in	   1964	   initiated	   the	   Peace	   Council	   of	   Nagaland,	   comprising	  eminent	   Naga	   figures,	   which	   tried	   to	   bring	   the	   various	   parties	   to	   the	   peace	   table	   (see	   also	  Thomas	  2016).	  Peace	   talks	  collapsed	   in	  1966	  due	   to	   the	  uncompromising,	  and	  rival,	   claims	  of	  territorial	   sovereignty	   and	   the	   NNC	  was	   banned	   by	   the	   GOI	   in	   1972.	   	  With	   increased	   Indian	  military	   pressure,	   the	   controversial	   ‘Shillong	  Accord’	  was	   signed	   in	   Shillong	   on	  11	  November	  1975	  between	  the	  GOI	  and	  the	  FGN	  of	  Nagaland.	  This	  required	  the	  surrender	  and	  disarmament	  of	  the	  NNC	  and	  the	  de	  facto	  ‘official’	  recognition	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  India.	  During	  this	  time,	  a	  group	  of	  Nagas	  went	  to	  China	  on	  a	  ‘goodwill	  mission’	  primarily	  to	  receive	  military	  training	  and	  procure	  arms.	  When	   they	  heard	  about	   these	  events,	   they	   immediately	  denounced	   the	  NNC	  as	  traitors	   to	   the	   Naga	   cause	   and	   formed	   their	   own	   group	   known	   as	   the	   NSCN	   (the	   Nationalist	  Socialist	  Council	  of	  Nagaland)	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Isak	  Swu,	  T.	  Muivah,	  and	  S.S.	  Khaplang	  on	  31	  January	  1980.	  	  Due	  to	  internal	  conflicts,	  Khaplang,	  a	  Naga	  from	  Burma,	  split	  from	  the	  NSCN	  in	  1988	  to	  form	  his	  own	  group	  (NSCN-­‐K).	  The	  remaining	  group	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  NSCN-­‐IM,	  after	  their	   leaders,	   Isak	  Swu	  and	  T.	  Muivah.	  Currently	  the	  latter	   is	  the	  most	  powerful	  group	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  	  On	  1st	  August	  1997,	  fifty	  years	  after	  the	  conflict	  began,	  a	  ceasefire	  was	  signed	  between	  the	  GOI	  and	  the	  NSCN-­‐IM,	  and	  political	  negotiation	  at	  the	  highest	  level;	  the	  ‘framework	  agreement’	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  these	  talks.	  So	  far	  the	  talks	  have	  included	  the	  main	  –	  but	  contentious	  –	  point	  of	  Nagalim	   (or	   ‘Greater	   Nagaland’)	   that	   includes	   Naga	   inhabited	   areas	   of	   Nagaland,	   Assam,	  Arunachal	  Pradesh,	  Manipur	  and	  Burma.	  The	  context	  and	  the	  unfolding	  of	  events	  are	  important	  to	   establish	   a	   timeline	   that	   elaborates	   on	   how	   the	   struggle	   of	   Naga	   independence	   evolved,	  particularly	  its	  relation	  to	  territoriality	  as	  a	  set	  of	  practices,	  identifying	  people’s	  ties	  to	  land.	  	  	  
	  
Sovereignty	  and	  ordering	  difference	  In	  textbook	  definitions,	  sovereignty	  usually	  means	  that	  the	  sovereign	  –	  a	  person,	  organisation,	  or	   institution	   –	   decides	   on	   all	   matters	   relating	   to	   lawful	   conduct	   and	   adjudicates	   on	   the	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legitimate	  use	  of	  coercion	  (Graham	  2008:	  13).	  	  Sovereignty	  as	  a	  political	  concept	  then	  is	  central	  to	  questions	  of	  authority.	  The	  state	  not	  only	  has	  the	  rightful	  authority	  but	  also	  the	  exercise	  of	  power.	   Thomas	   Hobbes	   (1588	   –	   1679),	   the	   English	   political	   philosopher,	   articulated	   this	  position	  most	  effectively	  in	  his	  magnum	  opus,	  Leviathan.	  Hobbes	  argued	  that	  the	  main	  effects	  of	  producing	  sovereignty	  are	   the	  ordering	  of	  difference	   that	  secures	  and	  safeguards	  a	   ‘sovereign	  unit’.	   Through	   flattening	   and	   ordering	   time	   and	   space,	   sovereignty,	   for	   Hobbes,	   is	   a	   civic	  response	   to	   the	   divine	   authority	   of	   God.	   By	   bracketing	   religious	   authority,	   sovereignty	   as	   a	  political	   doctrine	   is	   made	   explicit	   (Shaw	   2008:	   37).	   For	   Hobbes	   all	   people	   are	   capable	   of	  commonwealth	   (sovereignty)	   exemplified	   by	   progress,	   order,	   culture,	   art	   and	   science.	   	   This	  Hobbesian	   notion	   is	   very	  much	   centred	   on	   ‘“man”	   as	   a	   “knowing	   subject”’:	   ‘the	   subject	   (who	  knows	   with	   authority)	   and	   the	   sovereign	   state	   (who	   embodies/	   guarantees	   this	   authority)’	  (Shaw	  2008:	  36).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Such	   Hobbesian	   conceptions	   however	   are	   limited	   and	   can	   function	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   a	  national	  state	  reinforced	  by	  the	  ‘European	  myth’	  of	  Cartesian	  and	  cartographic	  political	  borders	  (Leach	  1960:	  49-­‐68;	  Wouters	  2016:	  104).	  Indeed,	  many	  studies	  of	  sovereignty	  from	  across	  Asia	  have	  noted	  their	  distributive	  nature	  –	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘galactic’	  (Tambiah	  1997);	  ‘theatre	  state’	  (Geertz	  1980);	   ‘anarchic’	   (Scott	  2009)	  –	   that	  have	  usefully	  provincialized	   (Chakrabarty	  2000)	  the	   political	   discourse	   of	   Hobbesian	   sovereignty	   of	   flattening	   difference	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	  order.	   In	   the	   Naga	   case,	   as	   Jelle	   Wouters	   (2016)	   has	   shown,	   the	   overlapping	   territorial	   and	  sovereign	  claims	  not	  only	  confounded	  the	  British	  administrators	   in	  the	  early	  19th	  century,	  but	  that	   they	   also	   recognised	   the	   ‘indigenous	   polity	   of	   the	   region’	   (Misra	   2011).	   Even	   amongst	  contemporary	  Naga	  movements	  and	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  Naga	  Hoho,	  Naga	  Assembly,	  and	  the	  nationalist	  groups,	  all	  have	  an	   interpretation	  of	  what	  Naga	  territoriality	  means	  that	  draws	  on	   present	   realities	   to	   shape	   the	   past,	   instead	   of	   allowing	   the	   past	   to	   shape	   the	   present.	   For	  example,	  in	  a	  booklet,	  The	  Bedrock	  of	  Naga	  Society	  (2003),	  published	  by	  the	  Nagaland	  Pradesh	  Congress	  Committee,	  S.C.	  Jamir	  (the	  main	  author),	  the	  former	  chief	  minister	  of	  Nagaland,	  stoked	  the	   flames	   of	   nationalism	   by	   questioning	   the	   primordial	   unity	   of	   the	   Naga	   nation	   since	   time	  immemorial.	  He	  asked	  if	  the	  Nagas	  had	  ‘a	  political	  existence	  at	  all	  immediately	  before	  the	  British	  rule	   or	   even	   during	   the	   British	   days?	   Were	   we	   really	   an	   independent	   nation?’	   Words	   ignite	  flames	  and	  even	  draw	  blood.	  He	  was	  quickly	  reprimanded	  by	  different	  organisations	  with	   the	  Naga	   Student	   Federation	   (NSF)	   burning	   copies	   of	   his	   booklet,	   while	   the	   NSCN-­‐IM	   made	   an	  attempt	  on	  his	  life	  –	  Jamir	  was	  labelled	  a	  traitor	  to	  the	  national	  cause.	  But	  Jamir’s	  stance,	  though	  modernist	  in	  its	  articulation	  (Anderson	  1991;	  Gellner	  1983),	  comes	  back	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  sovereignty	  and	  independence	  means	  in	  the	  context	  of	  political	  discourse	  where	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  fixed	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nation	  are	  what	  matters.	  Here	  is	  the	  tension	  between	  the	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modernist	   (Jamir)	   and	   the	   primordialist	   (NSF/NSCN-­‐IM)	   positions	   are	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  national	   project	   that	   takes	   us	   back	   to	   the	   earlier	   discussions	   about	   Naga	   identity	   and	   its	  different	  iterations.	  	  	  The	  question	  of	  the	  fixity	  of	  identity	  then,	  to	  some	  extent,	  is	  also	  reliant	  on	  a	  territorially	  defined	  place.	  But	   in	  the	  Naga	  case,	   this	   is	  not	  easy	  to	  define.	  Even	  in	  the	  NNC	  Yehzabo	  (Constitution)	  the	   issue	   of	   territorial	   jurisdiction	   remains	   ambiguous	   as	   it	   simply	   states	   –	   ‘The	   territory	   of	  Nagaland	  shall	  comprise	  all	  the	  territories	  of	  the	  Nagas…’	  (Article	  1,	  NNC	  2006).	  The	  subjective	  nature	  of	   ‘the	  territories	  of	  the	  Nagas’	  then	  begs	  the	  question:	  who	  is	  a	  Naga	  and	  by	  extension	  which	  territories?	  The	  history	  of	  the	  Naga	  cause	  has	  demonstrated	  different	  versions	  of	  who	  is	  a	  Naga	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  nationalist	  group	  one	  is	  in.	  For	  instance	  some	  question	  whether	  Manipuri	  Nagas	  can	  be	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	  Naga	  nationalist	  movement	   (Wouters	  2016:	  111).	  Others	  question	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  ‘Nagaland’,	  especially	  with	  the	  recent	  demand	  of	  the	  eastern	  tribes	   of	   Nagaland	   to	   separate	   and	   form	   a	   ‘Frontier	   Nagaland’	   state.	   All	   of	   these	   factors	  complicate	  the	  difficult	  territorial	  balance	  inherited	  by	  the	  colonial,	  and	  maintained	  by	  the	  post-­‐colonial,	  nation-­‐states	  (see	  Sammadar	  2009;	  Chasie	  2005;	  Horam	  1988).	  Finding	  a	  one	  size	  fits	  all	  idea	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  the	  political,	  cultural	  and	  territorial	  reality	  is	  not	  always	   feasible	   as	   one	   can	   see	   in	   postcolonial	   states,	  where	   previous	   borders	   are	   now	   being	  questioned	   to	   capture	   their	   haphazard	   process	   and	   where	   the	   resilience	   of	   maintaining	   a	  ‘unique’	   identity	  has	   come	   to	   the	   forefront	  of	  national	   imaginaries.	  This	   is	  not	   to	   suggest	   that	  territorial	   boundaries	   are	   unhelpful,	   but	   merely	   to	   point	   out	   the	   difficulties	   in	   ascertaining	  precisely	  where	  the	  lines	  can	  be	  drawn.	  	  	  	  	  What	   the	  discussion	   so	   far	   suggests	   is	   that	   the	  Naga	  movement,	   in	   its	  development,	  has	  gone	  through	  different	  phases,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  sovereignty,	  independence	  and	  self-­‐determination	  in	   the	   political	   language	   of	   nation-­‐states	   have	   tended	   to	   be	   the	   visible	   and	   official	   presence.	  However,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  seek	  an	  alternative	  archive	  –	  as	  a	  set	  of	  ideas	  –	  an	  archive	  that	  has	  largely	  eluded	  mainstream	  politics	  of	  audit,	  governance,	  and	  timelines,	  the	  role	  Christianity	  plays	  needs	  to	   be	   assessed	   because	   firstly	   it	   is	   related	   closely	   with	   Naga	   nationalism,	   and	   secondly	   it	  provides	   alternative	   notions	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   land	   that	   has	   the	   power	   to	   shape	   nationalist	  narratives	  of	  place,	  not	  solely	  determined	  by	  political	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  	  	  
Christianity	  and	  nationalism	  According	  to	  the	  Yehzabo	  (constitution)	  of	  the	  NNC:	  	  We,	  the	  people	  of	  Nagaland,	  solemnly	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  Sovereignty	  over	  the	  earth	  and	  the	  entire	  universe	  belongs	  to	  Almighty	  God	  alone,	  and	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  people	  to	   be	   exercised	   on	   the	   territory	   is	   a	   sacred	   trust	   from	   God,	   who	   sustained	   our	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forefathers,	   the	   national	   workers	   and	   our	   people	   through	   the	   years…(NNC	   2006	  preamble).	  	  	  	  The	  expression	  of	  a	  clear	  Christian	  identity	  in	  the	  preamble	  of	  the	  NNC	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  acknowledges	   the	   far-­‐reaching	   influence	   of	   Christianity	   on	   national	   life.	   The	   coming	   of	  Christianity	   to	   the	   then	   Naga	   hills	   in	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century	   through	   the	   American	   Baptist	  Missionaries	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  American	  Baptist	  Foreign	  Missionary	  Society	  (ABFMS)	  was	  a	  momentous	  act	   for	  many	  Naga	  nationalists.	  Not	  only	  did	   they	   introduce	  Christianity,	  but	   they	  also	   brought	  modern	   education,	   and	   a	   sense	   of	   identity	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   nations.	   The	   ability	   to	  articulate	  their	  first	  written	  expressions	  of	  Naga	  independence	  through	  the	  Simon	  Commission	  report	  of	  1929	  is	  a	  demonstration	  of	  this.	  In	  talking	  to	  me	  at	  length	  of	  this	  ‘cosmic	  plan’	  by	  God,	  a	  retired	  NNC	  General,	   told	  me	  that	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  American	  Baptists	  to	  the	  Naga	  hills	  was	  not	  happenstance.	  The	  Americans,	  he	  said,	  were	  actually	  interested	  in	  going	  to	  the	  Shan	  area	  of	  Burma	  and	  then	  onto	  China.	  But	  instead	  they	  came	  to	  Nagaland.	  This	  statement	  is	  confirmed	  by	  Mary	   Clark’s	   account	   of	   the	   beginning	   of	   missionary	   work	   amongst	   the	   Nagas:	   ‘From	   the	  beginning	  it	  was	  never	  contemplated	  stopping	  alone	  with	  these	  tribes	  bordering	  on	  the	  frontier;	  but	  on	  and	  on…these	  Mountains	  should	  be	  spanned	  and	  the	  kingdom	  of	  our	  Lord	  extended	  from	  the	  Brahmaputra	   to	   the	   Irawady,	   and	   from	   the	   Irawady	   to	   the	  Yangtze’	   (1907:	  135).	  The	   fact	  that	   the	  ABFMS	  played	  a	   role	   in	   instigating	  Naga	  nationalism	   is	  a	  question	   that	  has	  not	   really	  been	   addressed,	   partly	   because	   the	   ABFMS	   did	   not	   want	   to	   portray	   itself	   as	   involved	   in	  indigenous	  politics,	  particularly	  since	  they	  were	  merely	  guests	  of	  the	  British	  and	  then	  the	  Indian	  state.	   Their	   emphasis	   on	   social	   justice,	   conversion,	   education	   and	   civilization	   portrayed	   an	  international	   outlook	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   shy	   away	   from	   interfering	   in	   nationalist	   politics	   of	   the	  region	   they	   were	   involved	   in	   (Stanley	   2009).	   But	   it	   inadvertently	   helped	   create	   a	   national	  consciousness	  amongst	  the	  Nagas.	  This	  dilemma	  is	  recorded	  by	  one	  of	  the	  ABFMS	  missionaries,	  B.I.	  Anderson	  in	  1945	  wrote:	  	  Our	  Christian	  young	  people	  were	  especially	  vocal	  in	  their	  presentation	  of	  this	  demand	  [of	  Naga	  independence],	  this	  was	  due	  to	  their	  superior	  training	  as	  compared	  to	  those	  who	   had	   not	   accepted	   the	   Christian	   religion…the	   day	   had	   also	   dawned	   when	   the	  younger	  churches	  were	  given	  more	  self	  determination	  and	  the	  organizational	  changes	  in	  the	  Mission	  gave	  the	  national	  leaders	  more	  prominence	  and	  greater	  power.	  	  In	  the	  planning	  session	  of	  the	  Mission	  much	  spadework	  was	  toward	  a	  gradual	  integration	  of	  different	  groups	  into	  a	  strong	  Christian	  movement,	  leaving	  politics	  to	  be	  taken	  care	  of	  as	  opportunities	  arose.	  	  But	  we	  were	  not	  always	  successful	  in	  our	  desire	  to	  guide	  the	  churches	  (Anderson	  n.d.:	  68).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  There	  is	  other	  evidence	  in	  the	  ABFMS	  archives	  to	  suggest	  this	  close	  association	  of	  Christianity	  with	   the	   independence	  movement.	  Robert	  Delano	  working	  with	   the	  Sumi	  Nagas	  says	   in	  1953,	  six	   years	   after	   the	   independence	   movement	   started,	   says	   that,	   ‘Some	   of	   the	   people	   who	   are	  
 
10 
active	   in	   the	   independence	  movement	   are	   also	   leaders	   in	   our	   Christian	  work’.4	  More	  work	   is	  required	  to	  tease	  out	  these	  connections	  (see	  Downs	  2010),	  which,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  evidence	  in	  the	   ABFMS	   archives,	   are	   not	   always	   explicitly	   recorded.	   They	   feared	   that	   any	   interference	   in	  indigenous	   politics	   would	   compromise	   their	   activities.	   Regardless	   of	   their	   cautiousness,	   the	  ABFMS	  were	  asked	  to	   leave	  by	  the	  Indian	  Government	  because	  of	  what	   they	  saw	  as	  meddling	  with	   the	  Naga	   independence	  struggle	   through	   their	   support	  of	   the	  Christian	  Naga	  nationalists	  trained	  in	  their	  schools.	  	  	  But	   the	   main	   point	   I	   want	   to	   make	   is	   that	   Christianity	   attracted	   the	   Nagas	   in	   a	   number	   of	  complex	  ways.	  It	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  unique	  identity	  of	  the	  Nagas	  that	  accelerated	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  nation,	   but	   associating	  with	   a	   religion	   like	   Christianity	   brought	   about	   ‘transcendental	   values’	  (Peel	   2003:	   281).	   Exposure	   to	   European	   modernity	   through	   the	   colonial	   experience,	   but	  particularly	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  Christianity	  brought	  about	  the	  idea	  of	   looking	  at	   ‘nations’	  as	   distinct	   from	  other	   ‘nations’.	   It	   is	   helpful	   to	   recall	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  missionaries’	   own	  views	  were	  influenced	  by	  the	  prevailing	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘nation’	  inherited	  from	  the	  New	  Testament	  –	  ‘to	  the	  Gentiles’	  was	  literally	  ‘to	  the	  nations/peoples’	  (Peel	  2003:	  281).	  Translating	  the	  Christian	  gospel	   thus	  meant	   an	   acceptance	   of	   peoples	   or	   ‘nations	   as	   naturally	   given	  units	   to	  which	   the	  Church	  must	   speak’	   (ibid).	  Amongst	   the	  Nagas,	   the	   first	  American	  missionary	  E.W.	   Clark,	   had	  this	  to	  say,	  ‘if	  these	  wild	  Nagas	  were	  given	  proper	  education	  and	  if	  they	  accepted	  the	  Christian	  religion,	   they	  would	   become	   a	   great	   nation’	   (cited	   in	   Ao	   1970:	   14).	   For	   the	  missionaries,	   the	  notion	  of	   a	   ‘great	  nation’	  went	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	  proselytizing	   and	   civilising	   that	   introduced	  western	  notions	  of	  time,	  hygiene,	  clothes	  and	  habits,	  as	  well	  as	  education	  which	  to	  many	  Naga	  nationalists	  was	  the	  ‘greatest	  gift’,	  as	  discussed	  earlier.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  intense	  Indian	  military	  operations	  and	  the	  ongoing	  resistance	  from	  1947	  to	  the	  1970s,	  there	  was	  a	  substantial	  rise	  in	  the	  scale	  of	  conversions	  to	  Baptist	  Christianity	  among	  the	  Nagas	  of	  Nagaland.	  Although	  the	  numbers	  of	  Christian	  conversions	  were	  nothing	  revelatory	  until	   1941	   (17.9%	   from	   a	   population	   of	   around	   189,641),	   a	   sharp	   rise	   in	   Christian	   numbers	  post-­‐1941	  has	  a	  story	  to	  tell.	  In	  1951	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  to	  around	  52.9%,	  an	  additional	  30%	  in	   ten	   years.	   	   The	   increase	   in	   the	   Christian	   population	  was	   steady	   from	   then	   on	  with	   80.2%	  recorded	  in	  1981	  (Eaton	  2000:	  48),	  and	  in	  2001	  the	  number	  was	  almost	  95%,	  mainly	  made	  up	  of	  Baptists,	  Presbyterians,	  Roman	  Catholics	  and	  Pentecostals.	  It	  was	  Christianity	  that	  provided	  the	   majority	   of	   Nagas	   with	   some	   internal	   cohesion	   and	   gave	   them	   a	   ‘moral	   authority’	   that	  superseded	  parochial	  ‘tribal’	  loyalties,	  and	  territorial	  divide.	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One	  of	  the	  direct	  ways	  in	  which	  Christianity	  became	  central	  to	  Naga	  nationalism	  was	  the	  brutal	  tactics	  of	  the	  Indian	  military	  that	  grouped	  villages	  together,	  or	  Regrouped	  Villages	  (RGV).	  It	  was	  a	   tactic	   borrowed	   from	   the	   British	   in	   fighting	   the	   Malay	   communist	   insurgency	   in	   1950.	   It	  separated	   villagers	   from	   the	   ‘insurgents’	   by	   concentrating	   small	   villages	   together	   into	   one	  location,	   followed	  by	  close	  monitoring	   from	   the	  military	  who	  controlled	  who	  went	   in	  and	  out	  (Lintner	  2012:	  67).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Christian	  revivals	  were	  spreading	  all	  over	  Nagaland.	  The	  revivals	  were	  an	  occasion	  for	  self-­‐introspection	  and	  a	  recommitment	  to	  Christ,	  accompanied	  by	  singing,	   dancing,	   and	   prophesying	   about	   future	   events.	   These	   ‘groupings’	   brought	   different	  villages	   together	   and	   they	  participated	   in	   these	   revival	  meetings	   that	   provided	   an	   alternative	  vision	   of	   what	   it	   meant	   to	   be	   human	   and	   loved,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   brutal	   military	   tactics	   on	  display.	  This	  is	  how	  Lanu	  Longchar,	  a	  long	  time	  evangelist	  and	  a	  NNC	  worker,	  discussed	  it	  with	  me	  in	  an	  interview	  before	  his	  death	  in	  2016:	  	  	  	  	  Village	  life,	  without	  knowing,	  came	  together.	  Unlike	  the	  olden	  days	  without	  the	  love	  of	  God,	  the	  revival	  brought	  together	  people.	  	  Revival	  affected	  the	  moral	  law	  and	  the	  governance	   during	   that	   time.	   During	   that	   time	   NNC	   was	   also	   beautiful	   -­‐	   like	   the	  revival	  it	  was	  grassroots.	  NNC	  was	  like	  church	  work	  –	  it	  was	  beautiful.	  	  	  	  Although	   these	   revival	   activities,	   accompanied	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   NNC	   in	   the	   villages,	   gave	   a	  sense	  of	  the	  Nagas’	  destiny	  as	  a	  people	  under	  ‘moral	  law’,	  the	  aggression	  of	  the	  Indian	  military,	  particularly	  through	  their	  targeting	  of	  churches,	  remain	  as	  scars	  on	  the	  Nagas	  and	  memory	  of	  it	  still	  resides	  in	  the	  public	   imagination	  of	  an	   ‘Hindu	  state’	  destroying	  and	  undermining	  the	  very	  symbols	  of	  a	  people’s	  faith.	  The	  historian	  John	  Thomas	  (2016)	  and	  other	  Naga	  scholars	  such	  as	  Kaka	  Iralu	  (2000)	  have	  compiled	  accounts	  of	  these,	  and	  I	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  one	  or	  two	  to	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  atrocities.	  	  	  On	   6	   June	   1956,	   the	   village	   of	   Longpha	   was	   raided.	   The	   deacon	   of	   the	   church,	   Mr.	  Imtilepsuk	  and	  seven	  other	  church	  leaders	  were	  tied	  to	  posts,	  tortured	  and	  shot	  dead	  by	   a	   firing	   squad…Incidents	   such	   as	   these	  were	   always	  made	   into	   public	   spectacles	  and	  the	  symbolism	  of	  many	  people	  being	  tortured	  by	  being	  tied	  on	  a	  post,	  with	  hands	  stretched,	   like	   a	   crucifix	   did	   not	   fail	   to	   make	   an	   impression	   on	   the	   people…at	   the	  junction	  of	   two	   roads	   in	  Mokokchung,	   five	  men	  were	   tied	   to	  posts,	  wrists	   to	  wrists,	  hands	  stretched	  in	  crucifix	  fashion	  and	  shot	  dead	  in	  full	  view	  of	  the	  public.	  Moreover,	  church	  buildings	  were	  generally	  turned	  into	  torture	  chambers	  and	  church	  altars	  were	  desecrated	  (Thomas	  2016:	  123).	  	  	  	  It	   was	   during	   this	   period	   that	   the	   NNC	   attracted	   large	   numbers	   to	   their	   cause	   for	   Naga	  independence.	  Alongside	  this,	  the	  NNC	  leader,	  Phizo,	  was	  also	  a	  charismatic	  recruiter.	  He	  would	  travel	  from	  village	  to	  village	  all	  over	  the	  Naga	  areas.	  On	  one	  occasion	  during	  this	  period	  in	  the	  1950s,	   Phizo	   arrived	   at	   an	  Ao	  village,	   Chungliyimsen.	  Tia,	   a	   teenager	   at	   that	   time,	   recalls	   this	  event.	   Phizo	   asked	   the	   villagers	   if	   they	  wanted	   independence	   and	   to	   have	   control	   over	   their	  resources,	  government,	  schools,	  and	  access	  to	  modern	  technology	  like	  cars	  and	  trains,	  and	  the	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crowd	  replied	  ‘Yes’.	  Then,	  he	  would	  pose	  a	  serious	  question	  to	  the	  ready	  audience,	   ‘So,	  do	  you	  want	  to	  go	  to	  the	  jungle	  and	  fight	  the	  Indian	  army?’	  Yes	  was	  the	  response	  and	  he	  would	  travel	  from	  village	  to	  village	  and	  make	  everyone	  enthusiastic.	  ‘His	  politics	  was	  infectious’,	  remembers	  Tia.	  	  	  	  	  What	  was	  happening	  in	  the	  villages	  with	  regard	  to	  revivals	  and	  commitment	  to	  Christianity	  was	  also	  replicated	  in	  the	  jungle	  camps	  of	  the	  NNC.	  In	  the	  early	  days,	  gospel	  teams	  preached	  under	  armed	  guard	  and	  conducted	  many	  spiritual	  activities	  in	  these	  NNC	  camps.	  The	  NNC	  refused	  to	  fight	   on	   Sundays,	   due	   to	   the	   large	   numbers	   of	   pastors	   in	   their	   ranks.	   The	   UK	   newspaper	  Observer’s	   Gavin	   Young,	   in	   his	   book	  The	   Nagas:	   An	   Unknown	  War,	   offers	   us	   vignettes	   of	   his	  experience	   in	   the	   nationalist	   camps	   in	   the	   1960s.	   	   When	   the	   Naga	   platoon	   assigned	   to	  accompany	  him	  kneels	  down	  to	  pray,	  he	  remarks	  that	  it	  is	  akin	  to	  a	  ‘Cromwellian	  ingredient	  in	  the	   Naga	   struggle’,	   an	   expression	   related	   to	   Oliver	   Cromwell,	   the	   English	   military	   leader’s	  fervent	   religiosity.	   	   In	   the	   camp,	   over	   the	   officer’s	  mess	  were	   these	  words:	   ‘Praise	   God	   from	  whom	  all	   blessings	   flow,	  Praise	  him	  all	   creatures	  here	  below’	   (quoted	   in	  Glancey	  2011:	  183).	  The	  NNC	  even	  created	  a	  Naga	  flag	  with	  a	  rainbow	  intersecting	  a	  blue	  sky,	  a	  reference	  to	  God’s	  covenant	  with	  Noah	  in	  Genesis,	  symbolised	  here	  as	  God’s	  covenant	  with	  the	  Nagas.5	  Accounts	  by	  Gavin	   Young	   and	   Bertil	   Lintner	   (see	   below)	   provide	   us	   with	   useful	   glimpses	   of	   life	   in	   these	  camps.	  Both	  show	   the	  close	  connection	  between	   the	  political	   activities	  of	   the	  nationalists	  and	  the	   intimate	   relation	   to	   their	   identities	   as	   Christians.	   It	   is	   this	   Christian	   spirit	   that	   drives	   the	  Naga	  cadres	  to	  resist	  the	  Indian	  military	  onslaught,	  which	  gradually	  becomes	  more	  fervent	  and	  entrenched,	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  slogan	  ‘Nagaland	  for	  Christ’.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nagaland	  for	  Christ	  If	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Nagas	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  connected	  to	  God’s	  actions	  in	  the	  world,	  then	  the	  iconic	  slogan	  ‘Nagaland	  for	  Christ’	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  placeholder	  but	  is	  emblematic	  of	  the	  Nagas’	  partnership	  with	  God.	  During	  the	  Swedish	  journalist	  Bertil	  Lintner’s	  month	  long	  stay	  in	  the	  NSCN	  headquarters	  –	  Kesan	  Chanlam	  –	   in	  Burma	   in	  1980s,	  he	  recounts	  how	  Isak	  Swu	  the	  President	  of	  the	  NSCN	  shows	  him	  ‘the	  Iphai	  Missionary	  Centre’	  and	  tells	  him:	  	  The	  rulers	  of	  India	  and	  Burma	  will	  be	  like	  Herod	  of	  Egypt.	  	  If	  they	  don’t	  obey	  God,	  it’ll	  be	  to	  their	  own	  cost.	  	  Armies	  of	  rats	  will	  devour	  their	  lands.	  	  This	  God	  has	  told	  us.	  	  In	  1982,	  God	  said	  he	  felt	  pity	  for	  the	  Nagas.	  	  At	  that	  time	  we	  had	  our	  headquarters	  on	  a	  hilltop	  in	  the	  jungle.	  	  ‘I	  love	  you	  Nagas	  very	  much’	  God	  told	  us.	  	  ‘I	  won’t	  let	  you	  live	  in	  the	   jungle	   anymore.	   	   You	  must	  move	  down	   to	  an	  open	  place	  and	  build	  a	  new	  camp	  there.	  	  It	  should	  be	  called	  Iphai	  [untranslatable	  spiritual	  word]	  and	  you’ll	  not	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  defending	  the	  place.	  	  I’ll	  take	  care	  of	  that’	  God	  assured	  us…God	  protects	  us.	  	  He	  also	  told	  us	  to	  erect	  the	  big	  crucifix	  (Lintner	  1990:	  90).	  	  	  
                                                      5	  Daily	  Herald,	  May	  5,	  2003.	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Swu’s	   account	   reveals	   a	   very	   particular	   notion	   of	   Christianity	   that	   has	   become	   central	   to	   the	  then	  NSCN	  and	  now	  the	  NSCN-­‐IM	  ideology.	  Their	  1980	  Manifesto	  is	  perhaps	  the	  clearest	  sign	  of	  this.	  1. Unquestionable	  rights	  of	  the	  Naga	  people	  over	  every	  inch	  of	  Nagaland.	  	  	  2. Dictatorship	  of	  the	  people	  through	  the	  NSCN	  and	  practice	  of	  democracy	  as	  long	  as	  it	   is	  deemed	  necessary.	  	  	  3. Faith	  in	  God	  and	  salvation	  of	  mankind	  through	  Jesus	  Christ.	  4. Socialism	   and	   economic	   systems	   for	   the	   removal	   of	   exploitation	   and	   ensuring	   fair	  equality	  to	  all	  the	  people.	  	  	  5. Rules	  out	  saving	  of	  Nagaland	  through	  peaceful	  means	  and	  pins	  its	  faith	  on	  arms	  to	  save	  the	  Nation	  and	  to	  ensure	  freedom	  to	  its	  people	  (quoted	  in	  Glancey	  2011:	  188).	  	  	  	  This	  represents	  an	  odd	  conflation	  of	  Maoist	  socialist	  ideology,	  Christian	  salvationism	  (‘Nagaland	  for	  Christ’)	  and	  armed	  insurrection	  followed	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  democracy,	  but	  only	  as	  a	  stepping-­‐stone	   to	   ‘dictatorship	   of	   the	   people’.	   This	   is	   a	   concept	   that	   remains	   unclear,	   though	   it	   could	  mean	   power	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   people.	   It	   is	   Christian	   salvationism	   that	   has	   been	   the	  cornerstone	  for	  the	  NSCN-­‐IM	  in	  their	  fight	  against	  the	  Indian	  state.	  However,	  not	  everyone	  was	  convinced	  by	  this	  manifesto	  as	  the	  threat	  of	  communism	  was	  debated	  by	  the	  Naga	  churches	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1960s.	  Some	  feared	  the	  influence	  of	  China	  on	  the	  NNC	  who	  sought	  them	  as	  a	  new	  ally	  in	  their	  fight	  against	  the	  Indian	  military	  in	  procuring	  arms,	  training	  and	  logistical	  support.	  However,	   it	  was,	   in	   fact,	   these	  excursions	   into	  China,	  and	  the	  Naga	  churches	  reaction	  to	   them,	  that	   could	   be	   said	   to	   have	   brought	   about	   an	   increased	   zealotry	   in	   the	   NNC	   (and	   NSCN)	  articulating	  their	  Christian	  identity	  in	  their	  desire	  for	  sovereignty.	  Accusation	  of	  communist	  or	  atheist	  influence	  required	  the	  NNC	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  they	  were	  fighting	  to	  gain	  Nagaland	  for	  Christ.	  	  	  The	  Chinese	  were	  more	  than	  willing	  to	  entertain	  their	  Naga	  neighbours,	  who	  entered	  Yunnan	  in	  1967,	   posing	   as	   Christian	   peace	  mission	  workers	   and	   aided	   by	   local	   villagers	   and	   the	  Kachin	  Independence	  Army	  (KIA).6	  Once	  they	  arrived,	   the	  Chinese	  border	  guards	  were	  perplexed	  but	  amazed	  to	  see	  a	  large	  contingent	  of	  dishevelled	  and	  weary	  looking	  soldiers	  with	  old	  Lee	  Enfield	  rifles	  inherited	  from	  World	  War	  II.	  Unable	  to	  communicate	  in	  Chinese,	  only	  three	  recognisable	  names	   of	   the	   Chinese	   political	   hierarchy	   –	   Mao	   Zedong,	   Lin	   Biao,	   and	   Zhou	   Enlai	   –	   were	  mentioned	  by	  Thuingaleng	  Muivah,	   the	   then	  General	   Secretary	   of	   the	  NNC,	   as	   a	  way	   to	   show	  their	  knowledge	  of	  Chinese	  political	  history,	  before	  the	  Chinese	  invited	  them	  for	  tea	  and	  biscuits	  (Lintner	   2012:	   ix).	   Given	   that	   there	  were	   anti-­‐religious	   sentiments	   spreading	   in	   China	  during	  the	   Cultural	   Revolution,	   it	   is	   surprising	   to	   note	   the	   Nagas	   were	   unperturbed	   by	   these	  developments.	   In	  Tengchong,	  where	  a	   training	  camp	  was	  established,	  near	   the	  Burma	  border,	  
                                                      6	  Interview	  with	  Thinoselie	  Keyho:	  http://www.nagalimvoice.com/interviews/%E2%80%98gandhi-­‐supported-­‐the-­‐naga-­‐desire-­‐for-­‐independence%E2%80%99/	  (accessed	  11th	  October	  2017).	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the	  Chinese	  authorities	  allowed	  the	  Nagas	  to	  construct	  a	  small	  wooden	  church	  where	  Christian	  hymns	  could	  be	  heard	  every	  Sunday	  morning	  (Lintner	  2012:	  38-­‐39).	  	  	  In	  May	   1968,	   fearing	   the	   influence	   of	   Chinese	   communism	   on	   the	   NNC	   cadres,	   the	   Executive	  Secretary	   of	   the	   Naga	   Baptist	   Council	   of	   Churches	   (NBCC)	   produced	   a	   document	   against	  communism	  that	  was	  circulated	  widely	  amongst	  local	  churches.	  It	  highlighted	  the	  atheist	  nature	  of	   communism,	   and	  how	  key	   communist	   texts	   such	  as	   those	  of	  Karl	  Marx,	  Mao	  Tse	  Tung	  and	  Lenin	  might	   replace	   the	   Bible	   (Rao	   1986:	   88-­‐9;	   Thomas	   2016:	   151-­‐52).	   In	   response,	   General	  Mowu,	  a	  senior	  Naga	  officer	  who	  went	  to	  China,	  said:	  ‘As	  we	  were	  NAGALAND	  FOR	  CHRIST,	  the	  communist	  Chinese	  had	  to	  built	  a	  CHURCH	  for	  us’.	  Mowu	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  this	  was	  the	  first	  church	  built	  after	  the	  Chinese	  revolution	  and	  the	  ‘first	  church	  planted	  by	  “Nagaland	  for	  Christ”	  in	   foreign	   land.	  Many	  Chinese	  came	   forward	  secretly	   to	  know	  about	  god	  and	  we	  were	  glad	   to	  proclaim	   His	   name	   to	   them’	   (Shimray	   2005:	   91).	   It	   is	   no	   surprise	   that	   Muivah,	   the	   General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  NNC,	  and	  later	  of	  the	  NSCN/NSCN-­‐IM,	  after	  a	  few	  years	  in	  China,	  was	  influenced	  by	  socialism	  as	   the	  above	  manifesto	  clearly	   illustrates.	  But	   the	  churches	  back	  home	  remained	  suspicious.7	   Therefore,	   in	   order	   to	   defend	   against	   the	   attack	   on	   the	   NNC/NSCN’s	   links	   with	  communism,	  they	  effectively	  made	  ‘Nagaland	  for	  Christ’	  a	  dominant	  ideology	  for	  the	  nationalist	  movement	   to	   protect	   against	   not	   only	   communism	   but	   Indian/Hindu	   hegemony.	   Thus,	   they	  would	  turn	  questions	  about	  their	  Christianity	  and	  national	   identity	  on	  their	  head	  by	  declaring	  that	  the	  NNC/NSCN	  were	  the	  only	  ones	  protecting	  Naga	  Christianity,	  while	  the	  church	  sits	  idly	  by	  and	  has	  become	  compromised	  by	   the	   corrupting	   forces	  of	   the	   Indian	   state	   (Thomas	  2016:	  171-­‐175).8	  	  	  Due	  to	  this	  complacency,	  the	  nationalists	  believed	  that	  the	  forces	  of	  India	  were	  slowly	  making	  inroads	  by	  firstly	  threatening	  the	  Nagas’	  food	  and	  cultural	  sovereignty.	  The	  NNC/NSCN	  said	  that	  the	  ‘Hindu	  government’	  of	  India	  had	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  vegetarianism	  that	  would	  be	  enforced	  upon	  the	  Nagas	  whose	  main	  diet	  is	  pork.	  The	  NNC/NSCN	  also	  extended	  this	  ‘Hindu’	  hegemony	  even	  to	  the	  trading	  community	  who	  were	  viewed	  as	  the	  ‘teachers	  and	  instructors’	  of	  Hinduism,	  spreading	   religious	   texts	   such	   as	   the	   Bhagavad	   Gita.	   Finally,	   the	   entertainment	   business	   of	  Bollywood	  with	  their	  ‘Hindi	  songs,	  films’	  were	  seen	  as	  corrupting	  the	  national	  youth.	  All	  of	  these	  activities	  were	   seen	  as	   conspiring	   to	  oust	   the	  Christian	  God,	   ‘the	   eternal	  God	  of	   the	  Universe’	  (Shepoumaramth	  1995:	  273).	  To	  demonstrate	   their	  dedication	   to	   the	  Christian	  nation	  and	  by	  
                                                      7	  Much	  of	   the	   ideology	  developed	  during	  the	  NNC	  period	   in	  the	  60s	  have	  become	  a	  part	  of	   the	  NSCN,	  and	   later	  the	  NSCN-­‐IM.	   I	   therefore	   refer	   both	   to	   the	   NNC/NSCN	   as	   sharing	   this	   ideology,	   as	   Swu	   and	   Muivah	   were	   the	   main	  ideologues	  of	  the	  later	  NNC	  (1960s	  onwards)	  and	  the	  NSCN	  in	  the	  80s.	  	  	  8	  For	  Muivah,	  there	  is	  no	  contradiction	  between	  socialism	  and	  Christianity,	  which	  in	  some	  sense	  is	  what	  ‘liberation	  theology’	  –	  that	  combines	  Marxist	  ideas	  with	  Christian	  teachings	  –	  attempted	  to	  achieve	  as	  it	  became	  popular	  in	  Latin	  America,	  Asia,	  and	  even	  amongst	  the	  Nagas	  (Nuh	  1986).	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setting	   themselves	   apart	   from	   these	   corrupting	   practices,	   the	   NNC	   and	   especially	   the	   NSCN	  preached	   a	   puritanical	   lifestyle	   that	   banned	   alcohol	   and	   drugs,	   and	   discouraged	   sexual	  promiscuity	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	   ‘purify’	   the	  nation	  and	  to	  encourage	  God	  to	   fulfil	  his	  covenant	  of	  making	   ‘Nagaland	   for	   Christ’.	   In	   order	   to	   establish	   this	   covenant,	   schools	   and	   clinics	   were	  established	  by	  the	  NSCN	  that	  went	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  Christian	  teachings	  (Horam	  1988:	  76-­‐77),	  and	   ‘soldiers’	   conducted	   missionary	   activities	   in	   Burmese	   Naga	   territory	   by	   converting	   over	  40,000	  ‘animists’	  to	  Christianity	  (Shimray	  2005:	  159-­‐69;	  Lintner	  1990).	  Biblical	  names	  such	  as	  Zion,	   Canaan	   or	   the	   NSCN-­‐IM	   headquarter	   Hebron,	   are	   used	   as	   camp	   names	   that	   signify	   the	  pervasiveness	  of	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  symbols.	  	  	  Closely	  connected	  with	  Nagaland	  for	  Christ	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  mission,	  that	  the	  Nagas	  have,	  by	  cosmic	  design,	   been	   positioned	   between	   China,	   Burma,	   Bangladesh,	   and	   India	   (seen	   as	   largely	   non-­‐Christian	  countries)	  to	  spread	  the	  gospel	  (see	  also	  Freston	  2001).	  Demonstrated	  by	  Mowu	  and	  his	  victorious	  celebration	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  church	  in	  post-­‐cultural	  revolutionary	  China,	  this	  motif	  of	  mission	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  sovereignty.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  architects	  of	  the	  Nagaland	  Missions	   Movement	   founded	   in	   1970	   amidst	   the	   turbulent	   period	   of	   armed	   conflict,	   Alem	  Meren,	  when	  I	  interviewed	  him	  about	  the	  struggle	  for	  independence	  –	  that	  cost	  the	  Nagas	  over	  5000	   lives	   –	   shall	   not	   go	   to	  waste	   and	   that	   ‘we	  have	   therefore	   enlisted	  10,000	  volunteers	   for	  Christ	   to	   fulfil	   the	   great	   commission’.	   This	   is	   a	   point	   I	   have	   argued	   elsewhere	   (xxx),	   which	  suggests	  that	  the	  strategic	  mobility	  of	  missionaries	  ‘called’	  to	  a	  place	  is	  not	  by	  human	  design	  but	  by	  divine	  sanction,	  and	  the	  motivation	  for	  this	  calling	  being,	  in	  part,	  the	  impact	  it	  will	  have	  in	  the	  home	   territory	   with	   regard	   to	   sovereignty.	   This	   is	   an	   idea	   that	   many	   churches	   and	   prayer	  centres	  all	  over	  Nagaland	  have	  implemented.	  	  	  One	  such	  prayer	  centre,	  called	  the	  Sumi	  Alakishi	  Kighinimi	  (SAK),	  who	  have	  close	  connections	  with	   the	   different	   nationalist	   groups,	   see	   their	   purpose	   as	   primarily	   praying	   for	   the	  establishment	   of	   ‘Nagaland	   for	   Christ’.	   They	   view	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   Nagas	   as	   the	  beginning	  of	  their	  covenant	  with	  God	  in	  sending	  not	  only	  10,000	  missionaries,	  but	  as	  a	  national	  obligation.	   Their	   covenant	   of	   establishing	   Nagaland	   for	   Christ	   cannot	   function	   fully,	   argued	  Jacob,	  one	  of	  the	  members	  of	  SAK,	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ‘Nagas	  are	  still	  under	  India’.	  Once	   independence	   is	   achieved,	   there	  will	   be	   a	   surge	   in	  missionary	   activities,	   particularly	   to	  communist	   China.	   In	   fact,	   they	   envision	   this	   relationship	   as	   a	   ‘theocracy’	   where	   God	   is	   the	  sovereign	  over	  the	  Nagas.	  In	  fact,	  Isak	  Swu	  also	  pushed	  this	  idea	  forward	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  American	  newspaper,	  The	  Washington	  Diplomat.	  He	  said	  that	  Nagaland	  will	  be	  a	  ‘theocratic	  state’	  –	  ruled	  by	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  and	  where	  the	  Bible	  will	  be	  the	  constitution	  (O’Driscoll	  2003).	  In	  different	  ways,	   this	   idea	   appears	   in	   various	  media.	   In	   2009,	   the	   ‘Restore	  Nagaland	   for	   Christ	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Crusade’	  was	  seen	  in	  one	  of	  Nagaland’s	  main	  town	  Dimapur,	  organised	  by	  the	  United	  Christian	  Prayer	   Ministries	   (UCPM).	   Thuingaleng	   Muivah	   the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   NSCN-­‐IM	   has	  reiterated,	   in	  many	   speeches	  and	  occasions,	   two	   central	  motifs:	   ‘Nagaland	   for	  Christ’	   and	   ‘the	  unique	  national	  rights	  of	   the	  Naga	  people’	  (often	  articulated	  as	  Urra	  Uvie	   [our	   land	  belongs	  to	  us]).	  Indeed,	  during	  his	  speech	  in	  Pughoboto	  in	  Zeneboto	  district	  of	  Nagaland	  on	  24th	  June	  2010	  Muivah	   said:	   ‘We	   [referring	   to	   himself	   and	   the	   Chairman	   Isak	   Swu]	   are	   united	   on	   two	   key	  foundations:	   1)	   The	  will	   of	   Jehovah	   2)	   Our	   land	   and	   the	   National	   Rights	   of	   the	   Naga	   people’	  (NSCN	  2010:	  36).	  	  
God,	  land,	  people	  Although	  the	  Christian	  idea	  of	  Nagaland	  for	  Christ	  is	  the	  synecdoche	  of	  national	  life,	  the	  issue	  of	  land	  is	  tightly	  interwoven	  with	  this	  idea,	  giving	  Naga	  sovereignty	  its	  substance.	  The	  materiality	  of	   land,	   as	   I	   have	   suggested,	   is	   an	   act	   of	   narration	   and	   imagination	  with	   the	   power	   to	   shape	  where	  it	  belongs.	  Phizo	  in	  fact	  makes	  the	  point,	  during	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  NNC,	  that	  land	  is	  a	  sovereign	   entity	   for	   the	   Nagas	   –	   ‘every	   Naga	   family	   has	   got	   their	   own	   house	   and	   lands	   for	  cultivation.	   No	   family	   need	   worry	   for	   land…The	   feeling	   of	   personal	   ownership	   with	   perfect	  liberty	   has	   ingrained	   in	   the	   life	   of	   our	   people.	   As	   a	   result,	   our	   nature	   hungers	   after	   absolute	  freedom’	   (quoted	   in	   Nuh	   1986:	   99).	   Eschewing	   colonial	   intervention	   that	   resulted	   in	  questioning	  this	   ‘absolute	   freedom’,	  Phizo	   laments	   the	   loss	  of	   this	  privilege	  by	  suggesting	  that	  ‘this	  form	  of	  existence	  has	  much	  to	  do	  for	  our	  national	  struggle	  to	  remain	  independent	  without	  interference’	  (ibid:	  99).	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  land,	  in	  turn	  connected	  to	  ‘absolute	  freedom’,	  is	  central	  to	  Phizo’s	  notion	  of	  sovereignty.	  It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Nagas	  always	  had	  sovereignty	  over	   their	   land	  –	   it	   is	  only	  with	   foreign	   ‘intervention’	   first	   through	   the	  British,	  Americans	  and	  now	  the	  Indians	  that	  this	  tranquillity	   is	  disturbed.	  For	  the	  nationalists,	   they	  are	  not	  asking	  for	  any	  inch	  of	  the	  India,	  they	  simply	  want	  to	  be	  left	  alone	  in	  their	  own	  lands.	  In	  his	  1951	  plebiscite	  speech,	   Phizo	   says:	   ‘The	  Nagas	  do	   not	   ask	   Independence	   from	   India;	   indeed,	  we	   do	   not	  want	  anything	   from	  India.	  India	  has	   nothing	   to	   give	   away	   to	  Nagaland.	   We	   are	   Independent	   and	  sovereign	  in	  our	  own	  national	  right.	  What	  we	  ask	  is	  not	  to	  interfere	  [in]	  our	  administration	  but	  leave	  us	  alone	  and	  allow	  Nagaland,	  the	  national	  state	  of	  the	  Nagas,	  to	  continue	  to	  exist	  in	  peace	  and	  make	  progress	  without	  hindrance’.9	  But	  the	  question	  of	  land	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  secular	  object	  that	  lies	  dormant	  to	  be	  usurped	  by	  conquering	  forces,	  but	  an	  act	  of	  God	  that	  makes	  it	  precious	  to	  those	  who	  are	   fighting	  to	  protect	   it.	  The	  security	  and	  assurance	  over	   land	   is	  not	   lost	  on	  Phizo	  who	  acknowledges	  that	  	  ‘I	  always	  have	  a	  feeling	  that	  God,	  our	  Heavenly	  Father	  –	  our	  creator	  –	  is	  
                                                      9	  http://www.neuenhofer.de/guenter/nagaland/phizo.html	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with	  us	  and	  guiding	  us’.10	  In	  effect,	  land	  and	  God	  are	  intimately	  connected.	  Indeed,	  Muivah	  takes	  this	  idea	  one	  step	  further.	  	  	  In	   an	   interview	   with	   the	   anthropologist	   Abraham	   Lotha,	   Muivah	   argues	   that	   because	   God	  created	  heaven	  and	  earth,	  God	  has	  allocated	  a	  land	  for	  the	  Nagas,	  and	  ‘that	  portion	  particularly	  is	   this	   Patkoi	   range	   [hill	   range	  where	  Naga	   areas	   are]	   because	  we	  were	  made	   to	   settle	   down	  there…So	   Nagaland	   becomes	   homeland…Most	   precious’	   (Lotha	   2017:	   173).	   	   Explaining	   to	  Abraham	   Lotha	   that	   ‘land’	   and	   ‘Nagaland	   for	   Christ’	   are	   central	   to	   his	   idea	   of	   sovereignty,	  Muivah	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  because	  ‘Christ	  died	  for	  the	  Nagas	  and	  Nagaland’	  then	  Christ	  must	  be	  chosen.	  And	  all	  of	  this,	  he	  goes	  on,	  comes	  first	  from	  the	  will	  of	  God.	  Although,	  God’s	  workings	  are	  often	  cosmic	  in	  purpose,	  at	  least	  here	  on	  earth	  one	  must	  have	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  God	  given:	  just	  like	  ‘Jesus	  himself	  said,	  I’m	  a	  Jew’.	  And	  this,	  Muivah	  suggests,	  is	  primarily	  for	  identification.	  Just	  like	  God	  demarcated	  night	   from	  day,	   and	   light	   from	  darkness,	   so	  has	  God	  given	   the	  Nagas	   an	  identity	  that	  is	  ‘God’s	  will’.	  He	  continues:	  ‘Naga	  land	  is	  not	  created	  by	  Indians,	  not	  created	  by	  the	  British,	   not	   created	   by	   Naga	   people	   too.	   So	   who	  made	  who,	   there	  must	   be	   a	   creator’	   (Lotha	  2017:	  174).	  Both	  Phizo	  and	  Muivah	  envisage	  a	  land	  that	  belongs	  to	  the	  Nagas.	  Their	  language	  is	  inflected	  with	  a	  Christian	  vision	  of	  God	  who	  is	  active	  in	  the	  world	  and	  who	  provides	  sanctuary	  and	  meaning	  in	  the	  face	  of	  immense	  odds.	  It	  is	  not	  simply	  that	  Christianity	  is	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  externalised	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  identity	  politics,	  but,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  Christianity	  provides	  not	   only	   a	   way	   of	   knowing	   God	   but	   also	   of	   navigating	   the	   complex	   world	   of	   national	   life.	  Translating	   this	   into	  everyday	   language	  and	  weaving	   this	   into	   the	  national	  narrative	   is	   a	   task	  that	   has	   occupied	   many	   in	   a	   quest	   to	   understand	   the	   complex	   changes	   –	   from	   British	  colonialism,	  Christian	  missionaries	  to	  the	  Indian	  state	  –	  experienced	  by	  the	  Nagas.	  Formulating	  an	   indigenous	   polity,	   one	   that	   is	   aware	   of	   the	  modular	   nationalist	   paradigm,	   and	   one	   that	   is	  always	   conscious	   of	   the	   relationships	   with	   land,	   people,	   and	   the	   cosmos,	   brings	   about	   a	  distinctive	  style	  of	  imagining	  the	  nation	  that	  is	  always	  first	  and	  foremost	  their	  own.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  If	   the	   ‘European	   myth’	   of	   cartographic	   political	   borders	   has	   influenced	   most	   notions	   of	  sovereignty,	   so	   too	   have	   the	  Nagas	   been	   involved	   in	   demarcating	   their	   national	   territories;	   a	  task	  which	  continues	   to	  absorb	  much	  of	  national	   life	   in	  present	  Nagaland	  and	  Naga	   inhabited	  areas.	   Even	   the	   ‘framework	   agreement’	   with	   which	   I	   began	   indicates	   that	   the	   territorial	  question	  is	  very	  much	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  discussions	  regarding	  sovereignty,	  with	  existing	  states	  such	   as	  Assam,	  Manipur,	   and	  Arunachal	   Pradesh,	   opposed	   to	   any	   alterations.	  Much	   like	  Naga	  nationalism	   that	   has	   been	   borne	   out	   of	   the	   confluence	   of	   modern	   political	   identities,	   and	  
                                                      10	  ibid.	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